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REVISITING AUCTIONS IN CHAPTER II
Douglas G. Baird†

hen Eastern Airlines filed its bankruptcy petition in March
1989, its future was bleak. For decades, it had systematically
invested in the wrong airplanes, beginning with a commitment to
propeller aircraft in the late 1950s. Its cost structure was higher than
its competitors’. It had failed to find a viable market niche in a
deregulated environment in which the hub-and-spoke system
brought significant economies of scale. Eastern had already sold its
most valuable assets, such as its shuttle between Washington and
New York, and its entire work force was on strike. Moreover, its
service was poorly regarded and it had little good will with the general public. If Chapter II mandated that the assets of a publicly
traded firm be swiftly sold, however, someone would have bought
Eastern’s airplanes and landing gates for an amount sufficient to
provide a dividend to the preferred stockholders. Instead, the managers of Eastern and later a court-appointed trustee used the umbrella of bankruptcy law to try to keep the airline intact as a going
concern. Over the next two years, Eastern lost over a billion dollars.
The airline began liquidation only when its assets were insufficient
to pay the administrative expenses, such as lawyers’ fees, involved in
running the bankruptcy case.¹
Financial News Network entered Chapter II in early 1991.
Shortly afterwards, a joint venture between Dow Jones and Group
W offered to pay $90 million for FNN’s assets. A unit of NBC
countered with a bid of $115. The bankruptcy court ordered an auction of the firm’s assets. NBC eventually won with a bid of $146
million and the creditors were paid in full. NBC acquired the assets
in May 1991. The Chapter II proceeding continued because of the
many disputes involving possible fraud committed by its directors.
After the sale, however, resolving these disputes could have no effect
† The University of Chicago Law School.
1 See Claudia MacLachlan, Blame Flys in Demise of Airline, National
Law Journal, page I, 35-36 (May 27,1991) (vol. 13; no. 38).
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on how the assets were being used, and the general creditors of
FNN will likely be paid in Full. ²
The contrast between Eastern and FNN makes it easy to argue
that large, publicly traded firms should be put on the auction block
when they enter Chapter II and sold to the highest bidder. A speedy
sale separates the question of how to use the assets from the question
of how rights to them will be allocated among creditors, shareholders, and others. Fights over rights to the assets no longer
threaten to keep them from being put to their highest-valued use.
The assets are no longer in the control of a bankruptcy judge or one
of the parties to a priority dispute, but rather in the control of a person whose own money is on the line. That person is better positioned to know how to best use the assets and whether to keep the
firm intact or sell of its assets piecemeal..
Neither Eastern nor FNN, however, are representative of large
Chapter II cases. Eastern Airlines was eventually liquidated, while
most publicly traded firms successfully reorganize in Chapter 11.³ In
addition, Eastern Airlines’ Chapter II petition was filed in the
Southern District of New York, and reorganizations there are not
representative of comparably sized firms elsewhere.4 It would be a
mistake to press for dramatic reform of an entire system because of
the behavior of a few judges. FNN was equally unusual. The auctions in FNN may have been possible only because there was more
than one person that actively sought to buy its assets. Scholars not
known for their hostility to market mechanisms (including Frank
2 See Anne Rackham, Media Keeps Going Through Drumbeat of Turmoil, Los Angeles Business Law Journal, page 12 (December 30,1991) (vol. 13;
no. 52,)
3 Lawrence A Weis Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct costs and violation of
priority of claims, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 285-314 (1990) (30 out of 37 reorganized).
4 See Lynn M LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and
Forum Shopping in’ the Bankruptcy Reorganizations of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. II, 29-33. The Southern District of New York is
thought more “debtor-oriented.” It is more generous in its fee awards and more
likely to extend the debtor’s exclusivity period. Large cases to date in the
Southern District has disproportionately come before a single judge, the same
judge who heard Eastern.
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Easterbrook) have suggested that the costs of mandating public auctions of large firms in Chapter II exceed the benefits.5
In an earlier paper, I argued that auctions of publicly traded firms
should take place as a matter of routine shortly after the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.6 In this paper, I revisit the question in light of
the scholarship that has been done and the empirical data that has
been gathered over the last 6 years. Everyone agrees that auctions in
Chapter II are sometimes desirable and that sometimes, as in FNN,
those in control will find an auction in their self-interest. Indeed, if
those making the decisions in Chapter II were loyal agents of the
owners of the assets as a group and if they could effectively communicate information about the firm to third parties, there would be no
reason to require an early auction. Under these conditions, those in
control could be counted upon to conduct such a sale if it were in
everyone’s interest. I suggest, however, that those in control often
lack the incentive to act in a way that is in everyone’s interest and
that, even if they did, they might not be able to persuade third parties that they wanted an early sale to save the costs of bankruptcy,
rather than to get rid of assets that they (but not others) thought
would turn out to be worth less than those of firms that were indistinguishable to third parties. None of this would matter if remaining
in Chapter II for several years brought with it few costs, but these
costs, although still largely unknown, may be substantial. After a
brief discussion of the existing legal regimes and possible reforms
that fall short of mandatory auctions, I examine the costs even such
a modified Chapter II imposes. I then look at the agency problems
and other the barriers that prevent those in control from making
decisions that consistent with the bargain to which everyone would
agree ex ante. In the last part, I confront the costs that mandatory
early auctions might bring.
I.
In this part, I set out briefly the relatively narrow question that I
am confronting. First, I am not addressing the question of how
5 See Frank H Easterbrook, Is corporate bankruptcy efficient?, 27 J. Fin.
Econ. 411-17(1990).'
6 Douglas G Baird The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15
J. Legal Stud. 127 i1986). ’
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rights to assets should be divided in bankruptcy. I have advocated
that rights be allocated in a way that was consistent with the original debt contracts, but nothing here turns on that.7 Rather, the
question is whether disputes about rights to assets (however resolved)
be separated cleanly from the question of how the assets of the firm
are used. The question is whether a bankruptcy proceeding should
focus entirely on resolving disputes among diverse parties with rights
to the assets or whether it should also concern itself at the same time
with running an ongoing business.
Second, I am focusing on only a small subset of the firms that
file Chapter II petitions. Firms in Chapter II run the gamut from
the very small to the very large. These firms face radically different
problems when they are in financial trouble. One can, however, divide them into three rough groups. The first comprises two-thirds
or more of the Chapter II docket. These are the small mom-andpop businesses with assets of less than $5OO,OOO. Fewer than IO%
will ever successfully reorganize. For these firms, Chapter II is simply
a way station to eventual liquidation. Although these cases dominate
the docket in terms of numbers, they do not loom large as far as the
stakes involved concerned. The total liabilities (and total assets) of
these firms are less than 5% of those of all the firms in Chapter II.*
The second group of cases involves closely held firms of substantial
size that may in fact be worth keeping intact as going concerns. In
these cases, it is hard to rearrange the capital structure of the firms
without taking account of the firm-specific skills of the managershareholders and perhaps others as well. The firm may have a future
7 This is a view I share with many other scholars. Rasmussen has taken
this argument to its logical extreme and argues that Chapter II itself should be
simply one item on a menu of choices available to firms at the time they incorporate. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy (manuscript March 1992).
* Ed Flynn Statistical Analysis of Chapter II, Ernst & Young Study for
Administrative bffice of the U.S. Courts 12-13, 18-19 (October 1989). This is
not to say, however, that these cases are not important. What is important are
the social costs of these bankruptcy cases. Not only may these cases bring few
benefits, but the deadweight costs of these bankruptcy cases may be quite large.
The direct costs of bankruptcy consume a larger portion of the assets and the
indirect costs- principally delaying the liquidation of a firm that cannot
compete -may be much larger, in relative terms, than in the case of larger
firms that will, in all likelihood, remain largely intact.
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The large, publicly traded firm is the case in which making the
case for the mandatory auction is easiest. It is not enough, however,
to assert that a regime of mandatory auctions is superior to existing
Chapter II. One needs to ask if reforms are possibly in which one
can have the best of both worlds and ensure that early auctions take
place when it is in everyone’s interest, but not otherwise. In the next
part, I examine the ways in which current law stifles auctions and
should be changed even if one were of the view that those in control
of the reorganization should be able to choose between a quick auction and a negotiated reorganization. In subsequent parts, I ask
whether a mandatory auction regime would be preferable to this hypothetical one that nevertheless is built around a presumption that
those in control of the reorganization should be able to create a new
capital structure in which the old creditors and shareholders give up
their old rights in the firm for new ones.
I I.
A firm in Chapter II typically faces two conceptually distinct
problems. First, decisions have to be made about how its assets are to
be used. Firms in financial distress may have unsound business plans
that need to be revised. Some assets may need to be sold and others
acquired. Second, firms in financial distress need to untangle their
capital structures. Firms rarely have neat capital structures in which
the priority of claims is neatly set out. A secured creditor is entitled
to a priority only to the extent of the value of its collateral. In many
cases, however, it may be hard to value the collateral-such a the
firm’s plant and equipment -apart from the value of the firm as a
whole. Publicly traded firms may consist of several interrelated subsidiaries, each of which has guaranteed the loans of the other. The
priority of creditors is sometimes in doubt and sometimes subject to
attack on fraudulent conveyance or equitable subordination grounds.
There may be a large claim (such as a tax dispute with the IRS or a
mass tort claim) that leaves the relative entitlement of the creditors
in doubt. Sorting out these issues requires litigation that, with trials
and appeals, consumes a great deal of time.
The principal advantage of an auction is that it separates the two
issues. Some ways of using a market mechanism to sort out the
rights of the various players in Chapter II requires knowing how
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as a going concern only if the current manager-shareholders are kept
in place. Whether reorganized in bankruptcy or not, there needs to
be an elaborate set of negotiations among parties with a past and
future interest in the firm before it can get back on an even keel. An
auction for these firms in Chapter II may simply shift an elaborate
set of negotiations to a different forum.
The remaining group is the one of concern to us. This one
contains those firms that are publicly traded. In terms of sheer numbers, the other two groups dwarf this one. In the first seven years of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, only 99 firms out of the tens of thousands filing for Chapter II protection were traded on the New York
or American Stock Exchanges. 9 On the other hand, the total dollars
involved in these cases may equal or exceed those of the other two
groups combined.1°
There is a separation of ownership and control in the case of
these firms. An individual shareholder may control a large fraction
of the stock. 11 Nevertheless unlike the closely held firm, the
ownership and operation of the firm are not intertwined and, even
in a reorganization, the old equityholders can stay on as of right only
by putting in new cash. An auction, like a negotiated reorganization, gives them an opportunity to remain in control if the assets are
in fact worth more in their hands than in anyone else’s? It may be
necessary to give managers stock options and the like to give them
the right set of incentives, but the value of these options is small
given the overall capital structure of the firm. These cases are not
ones in which the equity interest will naturally gravitate back towards those who currently own the stock.
9 See Weis, supra note 3, at 286-88.
lo See Flynn, supra note 7, at ISI+ l*lynn reports that 67% of all payments in his sample came from firms with SIOO million in assets or more. A
substantial fraction of these (in fact more ttl:\ tl half), however, were payments
made in a single case (Johns Manville)
l1 See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth lxhn, The Structure of Corporate
Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, ~13 J. l’ol. lkon. 1x55 (1985).
-12 For an argument using the similarity hctwcen auctions and negotiated
reorganizations as a justification for the latter, SW l~rucc A. Markell, Owners,
Auctions, and Absolute Priority in lhkrup*y kwrpmizations, 44 Stan. L.
Rev. 69 (1991).
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much each creditor is owed and what priority that creditor enjoys.13
These mechanisms cannot disentangle the running of the business
from disputes over rights to the assets. A public auction, however,
does not require the resolution of any of these disputes. There can be
an auction of the assets and the proceeds can be placed in escrow.
The new owners of the firm can put the assets to their best use and
the competing creditors and shareholders can fight over the
proceeds.
Under current law, however, courts resist conducting a sale separate from the rearrangement of the financial structure. The practice
that has emerged under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code has been to treat
both the question of how to use the assets and who owns them together. The burden is on the party that wants to conduct an immediate sale to offer a business justification for selling the assets? This
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is easy to defend. The
provision of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the sale of assets
during the bankruptcy case was never designed to oversee the sale of
the entire firm. There are no procedural protections other than a requirement than that notice be given to affected parties and that they
be
. given a chance to appear before the bankruptcy court if they obJect l5 There is no formal mechanism to ensure that the sale does
not *disadvantage the diverse creditors and other interest holders who
may not individually have enough at stake to object. By contrast, the
plan confirmation process provides for extensive disclosure to all affected parties and-gives them a chance to vote. The Bankruptcy
Code’s procedural protections are focused around the plan confirmation process and courts are naturally wary of any course that would
short-circuit them.
In this environment, auctions are unlikely to take place. It is
bound to be in the interest of someone to demand that everything
take place at the time the plan in confirmed. It takes onlv one
shareholder who will be left out of the money if there is an immel3 See, e.g., Lucian A. Rebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, IOI Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988).
l4 See In re Lionel Corp 722 1; 2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983). For a discussion of
the case law, see Douglas 6. Hair;!, The Elements of Bankruptcy 225-29
(Foundation Press 1992).
l5 See II U.S.C. $363.
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diate sale to register an objection. Hence, under current law, having
an early auction also means having an early confirmation of a plan of
reorganization. There are, of course, cases in which determining the
priority of and the amount owed to each creditor is straightforward.
The Chapter IIS in which there is a “prepackaged plan" are often
cases in point. A plan of reorganization can be put forward virtually
the day the petition is filed and the confirmation may take place
within a few months. l6 These cases, however, are the exception.
Disputes over valuation and priority typically arise and, like most corporate litigation, these disputes will take time to work their way
through the courts. As long as the sale of the assets is tied to the
sorting out of competing claims to the firm, a speedy public auction
is not likely to take place. Let us assume, however, that Chapter II
could be reformed and sufficient procedures could be put in place to
protect dissenters and still allow those in control to conduct an early
auction when they thought it was in everyone’s interest.
In addition, let us also assume that we can eliminate some of the
more conspicuous agency problems that exist under current law.
Bankruptcy lawyers and other professionals now wield significant
power in Chapter II cases. They have little incentive to bring cases
to an early close. To prevent abuses, courts have required bankruptcy
professionals to keep elaborate records and compensate them
according to the amount of time they work. To the extent that a
firm suffers losses simply by virtue of being in bankruptcy, this kind
of compensation structure may not make sense. It is harder to craft
the right set of rewards in a system that relies on a hypothetical sale
back to the old owners. A set of rules might exist that rewarded
bankruptcy professionals for bringing about a quick auction when it
was in everyone’s interest, even if the Bankruptcy Code were not
amended to mandate such an auction.
There are also a number of ways in which the incentives of the
managers are skewed away from inducing them to bring a quick
auction. For example, the loyalties of those who are running the sale
l6 The procedures that the Bankruptcy Code requires, however, especially
its notice provisions, may be quite burdensome when ownership interests are
publicly held. For example, one must account for votes by individual creditors,
&en when the securities are held in street name. See In re Southland Corp.,
124 Bankr. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
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could be better defined. The general principle that the managers of a
firm in Chapter II have a duty to maximize the value of the estate is
not clearly established. 17 Under existing law, managers are too free
advance the interests of those, such as the equityholders of insolvent
firms, that are no longer the residual owners of the firm. Defining
their fiduciary duty more explicitly and providing sanctions if they
violate it (as does English lawI*) may do much to ensure that they
take everyone’s interest to heart when they decide whether to have
an early auction or a consensual reorganization.
Existing law does not take the time value of claims into account
to nearly the extent that it might. This compounds the problems
that exist when the managers are beholden to junior parties. Failing
to take time value into account in valuing senior claims systematically favors junior parties. In addition, the current legal regime discourages firms from selling assets in Chapter II in other ways. Most
conspicuously, sales to third parties are likely to receive less favorable
tax treatment than reorganization in which the old owners remain,
but with a different set of rights. Let us assume, however, that these
problems could be overcome without mandating auctions. The
question to which I now turn is whether mandatory auctions would
bring substantial benefits even after these reforms.
III.
The heart of the debate over auctions in Chapter II turns not on
whether auctions may sometimes be desirable, but rather whether
the freedom of choice of those in control should be curtailed. The
argument against curtailing their choice begins with the assertion
that the direct costs of bankruptcy are relatively small. In addition to
resolving disputes among creditors, a Chapter II plan of
reorganization is a complete recapitalization of the firm. Its marketplace equivalent is an offering of all the debt and equity of the firm
at the same time. For publicly traded firms in Chapter II in the
1980s, these costs ranged between .9 and of the book value of the
l7 Some courts however including the Seventh Circuit, have embraced
this principle. See Wabash VLley Power v. Rural Electrification Admin., 903
F.zd 45, 451 (7th Cir. 1990).
l8 -See Michelle J . White, Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European
.
.
r\
/
\
Lompanson (manuscnpt 1991).
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assets before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The average was
2.8% 19 By contrast, the direct cash costs of initial public offerings
for amounts greater than $10 million were about IO%.~O By this
benchmark, the cost of recapitalizing a firm in bankruptcy appears to
be substantially less than the cost of taking a firm public. A
restructuring in bankruptcy may be more akin to a private placement. A large part of the costs of the initial public offering involve
complying with the securities laws and these are not faced in Chapter II. Moreover, an offering of equity by a firm that has never been
publicly traded may be different from an offering of debt and equity
of a firm that has been. Yet private placement of debt of even a
large, well-known firm is not dramatically less, on a percentage basis, than the cost of a Chapter II reorganization. Moreover, the costs
of Chapter II seem in line with the costs of leveraged buyouts of
large firms that also involved reforming a firm’s capital structure. To
the argument that investment bankers could in principle sell securities in the reorganized firm, one can respond that, even if they
could, a hypothetical sale inside of Chapter II is cheaper.
Even if the direct costs of Chapter II seemed high relative to the
restructuring of firms that were not in financial distress, one has to
focus on that part of the direct bankruptcy costs that a mandatory
auction would eliminate and exclude the costs of resolving disputes
among the various players that would exist even in a mandatory auction regime. Once all of this is taken into account, it is hard to support the case for mandatory auctions on the basis of the direct costs
of bankruptcy. Instead, the case for requiring a speedy public auction

3

289.

l9 See Weis supra note at
One should note that the relative size of
direct bankruptcy costs may be much greater in smaller cases. For a case in
which attorney’s fees by the parties exceeded the value of the assets, see In re
Pullman Construction Industries, Inc., 107 Bankr.
(Bar&r. N. D. Ill.
1990). White, however, reports costs of a representative sample of all firms that
successfully reorganize are only
See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Liquidation and Reorganization, in Logue, Dennis, eds., Handbook of Modern Finance, chap.
pages 1-49 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1984). For a more
general discussion, see Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. Econ. Perspectives 129 (1989).
2o See Jay R. Ritter, The costs of going public, 19 J. Fin. Econ.
(1987). Some of these cash outlays, however, may have been rents captured by
investment bankers and not social costs.
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must begin with the assumption that the indirect costs of
bankruptcy are large and that, even with substantial reforms, those
in control of the reorganization will not avoid them.
In the case of closely held firms, the indirect costs of bankruptcy
are easy to identify. The shareholders are typically also the managers
of the firm. Because of their firm-specific human capital, the firm
may not have a future as a going concern without them. Bankruptcy
judges are reluctant to terminate the exclusivity period or lift the automatic stay as long as it appears that the firm can in fact survive as a
going concern.21 Hence in the case of these firms, the managers are
in control. 22 Moreover’ their interests are allied with (and indeed
indistinguishable from) the interests of the shareholders. Delay can
only help the shareholders. If there is an immediate sale, the
shareholders of an insolvent firm will be left out of the money. If
there is a delay before the day of reckoning, the fortunes of the firm
may improve and the shareholders may be left with something.
Hence, these managers have an incentive to stretch of the reorganization process. The indirect costs of bankruptcy are often large because the managers may continue to run the firm as a going concern
long after it should have been liquidated.
Indirect costs for large publicly traded firms are harder to identify. In most cases (Eastern being a conspicuous assumption), the
firm will continue to do business as usual in bankruptcy and afterwards. Hence, we do not see those in control postponing a desirable
liquidation. Those in control might have an incentive to make risky
investments in the hope that they will be lucky and the firm will become solvent, but, as I have already noted, courts are reluctant to
approve major changes outside the context of a plan of reorganization. The indirect cost of bankruptcy in the case of publicly traded
firms result largely from inaction. A firm continues to do business as
usual in Chapter II. Bloomingdale’s and Macy’s look much the same
21 In the case of closely held firms the exclusivity period itself does not
matter much. What matters is whether ;he bankruptcy judge is either willing
to lift the automatic stay or confirm a liquidating plan. See Douglas G. Baird
& Randal C. Picker, A Simple N oncooperative Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. Legal Stud. 311(1991).
22 Empirical study bears this out. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in
Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57
Am. Bar&r. L.J. 247,
(1983).

266-69
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to their customers. Indeed, once they are in bankruptcy, they may
look better because suppliers can ship goods with greater confidence
that they will be paid. For many firms, however, simply preserving
the status quo for two or three years will come at a large cost. A firm
whose managers are preoccupied with a Chapter II reorganization
may find itself lagging its competitors once the reorganization is
over.
Costs such as these, however, are not easy to measure. One can
compare the performance of firms in bankruptcy with similar firms
outside, but it is hard to know if the differences stem from the indirect costs of bankruptcy or to the underlying differences between the
firms that led one of them to file a bankruptcy petition in the first
place. An opportunity to assess the indirect costs of bankruptcy came
when the Texaco bankruptcy ended suddenly and much more
quickly than anyone expected. Mnookin and Wilson argue that the
change in the price of Texaco stock that took place at this time reflect in substantial part the market’s guess at the expected saving
from the shortening of Texaco’s stay in bankruptcy.23 The rise in
the stock price was large. Indeed, the rise was so large (in the neighborhood of $2 billion) that some suspect that something else was
going on. For example, at the same time that the reorganization was
coming to a close, there were indications that Texaco was “in play”
and might be taken over. The rise in price may have been due to the
possibility of a takeover rather than to saving from an early departure
from bankruptcy. One simply cannot draw too many inferences
from a data set of one.
Even if the indirect costs of bankruptcy were high, one would
not want to mandate auctions if those in control could be trusted to
weigh these costs against the costs of an early auction. Many assume
that those in control cannot be trusted to make decisions that are in
everyone’s interests. The managers of publicly traded firms are entrenched and worry about their own interests and not those of the
creditors and shareholders as a group. Empirical evidence, however,
23 Robert H Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and
Market EffIcienci: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 U. Va. L. Rev. 295,
312-15 (1989). See also David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The costs of
conflict resolution and financial distress: evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil
litigation, 19 RAND Journal of Economics 157 (1988).
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suggests that one must be cautious about reaching such a conclusion
too quickly. This evidence suggests that the senior managers of publicly traded firms in financial distress typically lose their jobs. For example, fewer than IO% of the CEOs in place 18 months before the
filing of the petition are still around at confirmation of the plan
(which takes typically takes place 2 or 3 years after the filing of the
petition). Indeed, almost half of those hired to replace them were
ditched as well. 24 In short managers are these firms are not entrenched. To say this, however, is not to say that the managers are
pursuing the interests of the firm as a whole, only that they are likely
to be pursuing the interests of those who have the power to control
them. Although the creditors’ committee and the postpetition
lender be able to exercise control indirectly, the shareholders nominally continue to control the managers and managers, at least in
same cases, o openly embrace the idea that their duty lies with the
shareholders.2 P
Moreover, the monitoring mechanism that exists in bankruptcy
is necessarily much cruder than the one that exists outside. The automatic stay prevents creditors from using the powers given them in
loan covenants. The power of the shareholders to control the managers may be reduced as well given the power of the bankruptcy
court to enjoin meetings of shareholders.26 During a reorganization
in which there are competing interests that are diversely held, much
of the control rests with the bankruptcy judge. The judge’s relative
inability to monitor the firm would take away from the managers
any pressure to conduct an early sale. Hence, one can argue that,
even if managers do not have the equivalent of tenure, they do not
have an incentive to expedite matters either. Given that the sale is
more likely to end their jobs than the alternative course, it is not one
24 See Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganizations of Large, Publicly Held Companies
(manuscript) ((D ecember 1991). See also Stuart C. Gilson, Management
Turnover and Financial Stress, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 248 (1989). Gilson suggests a smaller, but still substantial turnover rate for the managers of distressed
firms.
25 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 24.
26 See In re Johns Manville Corp., 801 F.zd
(2d Cir. 1986).
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that they would favor in the absence of some pressureJ7 Some have
argued that the inability to find someone whose interests are allied
with the owners as a group makes it hard to have an auction that
will obtain top dollar, given that the timing of the auction itself
requires discretion.28 This argument, however, proves too much. As
hard as it may be for a bankruptcy judge or someone else to conduct
an auction, these difficulties pale beside the task of monitoring the
ongoing business decisions of a large, publicly traded firm. The case
for-a quick auction is made stronger, not weaker, if there is no single
agent of the residual owner to make decisions.
The managers in a individual case might not pursue an early
auction if given the choice even if they were perfect agents of the
owners of the firm and even if the indirect costs of bankruptcy were
substantial. s9 An auction might not be sold for an amount that
reflected their full value. A firm’s prospects may not be equally well
known to all the players. It may be that the person that controls the
timing of the auction is systematically better informed than anyone
else about how the uncertainty will resolve itself. Assume, for example, that half of the firms have a 75% chance of being worth $200
and a 25% chance of being worth $100. The other half have only a
25% chance of being worth $200 and a 75% chance of being worth
$100. The person controlling the sale knows what kind of firm is
being sold, but has no way to communicate this information to anyone else. In the case of the second kind of firm, the person in con27 Bradley and Rosenzweig compare bankruptcy filing under existing
Chapter II with the legal regime in place before 1978 and suggest that the current regime in fact benefits managers at the expense of the other players. See
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter II,
IOI Yale L.J. 1043 (1992). One must, however, be reluctant to rely too heavily
on their empirical findings because, as they recognize, the differences between
the kinds of firms that filed for bankruptcy under the two regimes make the
comparisons hard. The old regime, for example, may have allowed the managers of similar firms to capture as much wealth, but the firms that filed under
the old regime might have been so far gone that there was simply less for their
mana ers to appropriate.
2 !s See e g Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 415-16.
29 Thl ah&se selection argument that follows is, of course, a familiar one,
being one of many variations on the standard “lemons” problem. See G.
Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 89 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970).
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trol might be willing to have an immediate auction, but the person
controlling the first kind of firm would not as long as there was no
way to convince third parties that it was a firm of the first type
rather than the second. Because a third party buyer would never bid
more than $150 for the firm if there were an immediate sale, the
person controlling the sale of the first type of firm would choose to
wait until the uncertainty resolved itself. Taking a 25% percent
chance of $100 in return for a 75% chance of $200 is much better
than settling for a sale price of no more than $150. Even if keeping a
firm in Chapter II is costly and even if many business opportunities
may be lost while a firm remains in reorganization, firms may
nevertheless be forced to incur these costs if buyers drew the inference from the fact of an early sale that the fortunes of the firm were
bleaker than they otherwise appeared.
The inability of those controlling the sale of good firms to distinguish themselves from those controlling the sale of bad firms may
itself prevent speedy auctions from going forward in any legal regime
in which having an auction is optional. Rental car companies are
able to realize high prices on their used cars because they sell all of
their cars after a certain period of time. The market for these cars is
not like the ordinary market for used cars in which buyers fear ‘that
only the ones that are lemons are being put on the market. Similarly, being able to realize a high price for firms in Chapter II at a
quick auction might be possible only if all firms were sold.
The owners of good firms may be able to devise some mechanism to distinguish themselves from the bad firms at an immediate
auction. Their own willingness to bid at the auction would, for example, itself communicate information.30 A legal rule that required a
speedy sale of all firms, however, would avoid the loss that now can
arise. If third parties assume that a firm that is sold quickly is a bad
firm, good firms must stay in bankruptcy until third parties can
ascertain their value. If delay is costly, owners of good and bad firms
would be collectively better off from an immediate sale. To be sure,
those firms that were likely to do well might be sold for the same as
those that were likely to do poorly, but everyone might be better off
over the long run. In short, even if the parties wanted a speedy
auction, they might nevertheless find in their interest to wait if they
3o See Markell, supra note

12,

at 107-11.
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knew their firm would likely enjoy a bright future, but had no
credible way of convincing potential buyers except by waiting for the
future to come.
I V.
As long as the question of the indirect costs of bankruptcy remains unknown or hovers in some intermediate range and the costs
of monitoring those running a firm in Chapter II do not seem
overwhelming, the debate over early auctions in Chapter II is likely
to focus on the costs that the early auction itself brings. Some of the
objections to early auctions seem unfounded. One objection focuses
on the potential loss of the “bust-up” premium.31 Assets of firms in
financial distress often should not stay in the same configuration.
The process of finding buyers for each of the pieces takes time but
brings a “bust up” premium that some think will be lost if there is a
single auction in which all the assets are sold at once (even if they
are not sold as a unit). An immediate auction, however, in which
there is competitive bidding should not squander the “bust up” premium. The bidders at the auction will take into account the amount
for which they will realize either from using the assets themselves or
selling them. In a competitive auction, the buyer will enjoy only a
return on its entrepreneurial skills in knowing how to divide up assets and how to find buyers. Many of those involved in a bankruptcy
reorganization, including managers hired as “turn-around artists”
after the filing of the petition might prefer to employ their own entrepreneurial skills. Realizing the highest dollar value from the sale,
however, does not require that the sale of the assets take place over
time. As long as the auction itself is a competitive one, the eventual
gains from breaking up the assets will be reflected in the sale price.
Some argue that uncertainty itself will dampen the bidding at an
early auction. A firm in financial distress faces an uncertain future,
but this fact alone does not mean the winning bidder will pay less
than the firm’s true value. Firm may be worth $200 or $100 depending upon the course of future events. Risk neutral buyers in a competitive auction should be willing to pay $150 for it. Half the time,
someone will, in retrospect, acquire Firm for a bargain price, but
31 See LoPucki 8c Whitford, supra note 24.
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only because in the other cases someone will pay too much. Uncertainty itself does not change the expected value. As long as both
those who will enjoy the proceeds of the sale and the buyers at the
sale are risk neutral, they will be indifferent between $150 today or a
fifty-fifty chance of $100 or $200 in the future. Even if both the
creditors and the buyers are both risk averse, uncertainty is an argument against a speedy sale only if the buyers are apt to be more risk
averse than the creditors. It does not seem on the face of it that
those who control vulture funds or, more generally, those who are
actively engaged in the market for corporate control are systematically more risk averse than creditors and shareholders generally.
Other potential costs of an early auction are harder to dismiss.
The benefits of an early auction turn crucially on who comes and
bids. Shliefer and Vishny point out that when one firm in an industry suffers from financial distress, other firms in the same industry may suffer from distress as well. Even if they are not themselves
in reorganization, their own financial condition may keep them
from entering the bidding. In Shliefer and Vishny’s model, the price
the creditors realize at an auction may not only be low, but also the
winning bidder may not be the person who values the asset the
most. The winning bidder waits for some period of time and then
sells the assets to someone with expertise in the industry after economic conditions change.
The possibility that the winning bidder may hold the assets for a
period of time and then resell them is not alone dispositive. Indeed,
at the time of the loan, the creditors might not object to a sale on
these grounds even if they would realize more if they were hold on
to the assets, incur substantial bankruptcy costs, and then sell to the
same ultimate buyer. The standard assumption that the optimal rule
was one that ensured that the Chapter II proceeding was run in a
way that maximized the value of the estate is not self-evident. Just as
shareholders of a firm may be better off ex ante if managers are not
able to auction the firm once there has been an initial bidder,32 the
32 Daniel Fischel and (ironically in this context) Frank Easterbrook are
best known for this point. For their latest views on this issue, see Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
162-211 (Harvard University Press 1991). See also Alan Schwartz, The Fairness
of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. Legal Stud. 165 (1988). For
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creditors and other interested parties may prefer ex ante a speedy sale
at a lower price that puts the assets to their highest valued use. This
course is preferable if a subsequent sale at a higher price comes only
after significant bankruptcy costs are incurred. These costs are a
deadweight social loss that the parties, before the fact, would want
t o avoid.33 This issue parallels one that triggered much of the
takeover debates in the 1980s. If delay in bankruptcy brings with it
costs that are a dead-weight social loss, an investor with a diversified
portfolio might prefer that a firm be sold quickly even if it were not
being sold for top dollar.
Shliefer and Vishny, however, identify an additional problem
that can arise when an industry’s debt capacity chills the bidding at
an auction: The assets spend some amount of time in the hands of
someone who cannot make the best use of them.34 The winning
bidder not only pays too little, but is not someone who values the
assets as much as the existing creditors and shareholders. The value
lost while the assets are in the hands of the winning bidder may exceed the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. Their argument,
however, suffers from two weakness as applied to publicly traded
firms. First, while the problem of debt capacity may loom large in
some cases, it should not loom large in the case of publicly traded
firms. In these cases, there is a substantial separation of ownership
and control. The creditors and the shareholders for the most part
hold diversified portfolios and have no special expertise with respect
to the industry in question. The winning bidders must find managers who are adept at running the firm, but finding such managers
an alternative view, see Lucian &ye Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for
Takeover Policy, 17 J. Legal Stud. 197 (1988).
33 The question of linking bankruptcy rules with the more general
problem of capital structures and ex ante incentives has been a focal point of recent bankruptcy scholarship. Randy Picker’s work has done the most to draw
attention to it. See Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools (University of Chicago Working Paper No. 5, 2d Series,
February 1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Entrenchment, and Human Capital (manuscript November 1991); Robert
Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy and the Allocation of Control
(manuscript February 1992).
34 See Andrei Shliefer and Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and
Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach (manuscript December 1991).

REVISITING AUCTIONS

IN

CHAPTER

II

I9

should not be harder when the firm is in an industry that is going
through an economic downturn. If anything, it should be easier. In
any event, the winning bidders can at least match the performance
that the firm would have in bankruptcy by retaining the current
management. The winning bidders may be able to put the assets to
better use and they should not put them to worse use.
Second, their analysis is most apt for firms that are experiencing
financial distress, but which otherwise have sound business plans. In
many cases, firms in Chapter II need new business plans. Divisions
need to be sold off and out-dated factories need to be shut down.
The expertise that is needed is not necessarily that of managers with
skills particular to the industry, but rather with skills peculiar to firms
in distress. Having the firm in the hands of someone who would
own it only through a period of distress may be a good thing, rather
than a bad thing. An auction makes it easier for a firm to be in the
hands of a wartime general during a transitional period.
The large leveraged buyouts of the 1980s as well as the active
market in corporate control show that the size of these publicly.
traded firms in bankruptcy does not itself prevent the requisite
amount of capital from being assembled. (One needs only bear in
mind that the existence of this takeover market in the case of Texaco, the largest firm ever to enter Chapter II, was what made measuring the indirect costs of its bankruptcy suspect.) In recent years,
there has been much more active trading in the debt of firms in
Chapter II. In one case, there was in fact a tender for the debt of the
firm. In many auctions, however, the owner of the asset not only
controls the timing of the auction, but also sets a reservation price. A
rule mandating a quick auction bypasses these. What ultimately
ensures that creditors will realize the most from the assets, however,
is active competition among bidders, especially among those whose
expertise lies in breaking firms up. More people with such expertise
would surely exist in a world in which one could acquire firms
without settling all the battles among its owners than exists in our
world, but whether enough people would exist to create an active
market among the dozen or so cases that arise each year is not clear.
Gertner and Picker have identified a different barrier that might
prevent assets from being put to their highest valued use after an
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early auction.35 Immediately after a firm enters Chapter II, potential
bidders may not be able to tell how much the firm is worth or what
must be done with its assets. Determining what should be done
with assets turns crucially on the kinds of cash flows assets can
generate in their current use. Learning this information may be hard
immediately after a firm has entered bankruptcy. The managers of
distressed firms pick and choose among their creditors. Squeaky
wheels get greased. Short-term creditors may be favored over longterm creditors. The managers may buy less than they need from
suppliers who are vigilant and more from those that are not. Assets
cannot be put to their highest valued use until the dust settles.
Chapter II offers a “breathing space” in which third parties can observe the firm’s cash flows without the distortions that accompany
financial distress outside of bankruptcy. Gertner and Picker suggest
that mandating an early auction may force third parties to bid on the
firm without knowing what its assets are worth or even whether
they should be kept together. The winning bidder must sort out the
affairs of the firm. To be sure, after he determines what to do with
the firm, he can then sell it to the person who in fact can put it to
its best use. In this event, however, the winning bidder does exactly
the same thing that takes place in Chapter II.
The Gertner-Picker model has two important implications for
analyzing auctions in Chapter II. First, one cannot compare the
direct costs of a bankruptcy reorganization with the direct costs of
an early auction. An auction may need to be followed by a subsequent sale. By contrast, a plan of reorganization may put the assets
to their ultimate use as soon as it is implemented. Hence, the cost of
both the auction and the subsequent sale must be compared with
the direct bankruptcy cost. Second, in assessing the magnitude of
indirect bankruptcy costs, one must isolate those costs that are incurred only in a bankruptcy regime. If the successful bidder does not
know what direction the firm should take until he can see the firm
operate without its cash flows being juggled about, he may be forced
to continue the status quo, much as is now the case in Chapter II.
The firm may stagnate-regardless of the legal regime. To be sure,
those in control of a firm in Chapter II have an incentive to incur
35 See Picker & Gertner, supra note 33.
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these costs longer than necessary, and a successful bidder does not.
This difference, however, may not be a large one.
Gertner and Picker’s model may force a shift in focus. Much of
the debate has looked at the relative advantages of mandatory auctions and negotiated reorganizations without asking how the firm
got into Chapter II in the first place. This view is too myopic. One
only knows how well a set of reforms inside of bankruptcy will work
after one understands how they will affect the way parties behave
before bankruptcy. One cannot expect the same parties to file a
Chapter II petition at the same time they file now if the filing triggered an immediate public auction. Just as managers will do much
outside of bankruptcy to resist hostile takeovers, they may well be
reluctant to begin a bankruptcy process that will lead to an auction
that is the functional equivalent of a hostile takeover. A Chapter II
regime in which auctions were the rule of the day is not going to be
one that managers of troubled firms will embrace with much enthusiasm.
The question that needs to be asked is whether the creditors can
fill the role that managers now play in putting the firm into
bankruptcy. If, as in the Gertner-Picker model, the creditors are not
well informed and the managers can keep bad news from them by
manipulating cash flows, then there may be no one that puts a firm
in bankruptcy and, even if there were, a bankruptcy with a mandatory auction would bring few benefits because the successful bidder
would have to mark time, unscramble the affairs of the firm, and incur the same direct and indirect costs that we now see in
bankruptcy. On the other hand, if creditors are able to monitor the
firm and are not misled by the managers’ manipulation of the cash
flows, then we may count of them to file bankruptcy petitions.
They do not need a “breathing space” to figure out what to do with
the firm’s assets. The prospect of an early auction might also change
the dynamics of workouts outside of bankruptcy for the better. Recalcitrant creditors who now would throw procedural obstacles in
the way of a reorganization would have much less of an incentive to
resist a workout if the ‘day of reckoning in bankruptcy came quickly
and predictably. A quick auction may serve the same function as a
baseball arbitrator. Parties may be more likely to narrow their differences and reach agreement if they knew that, in the absence of
agreement, their rights would be measured by a market baseline.
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